Introduction
Is God Back?
1 A recent popular book -God is Back 2 -answers in the affirmative and joins a host of others that argue that religion has not vanished from our supposedly secularized world. Long imagined to be dying, religion instead is alive, vibrant, and stronger than ever, these books claim. In fact, a new orthodoxy seems to be emerging: a whole "religion in public life" industry now triumphantly celebrates the death of the secularization thesis. The evacuation of religion from the public sphere -politics, welfare, education, health care, media -has not happened, these scholars claim, the way secularization theories predicted.
Everyday experience seems to confirm the celebrationist view: Even in Europe, long considered the stronghold of secularization, religion has become a topic of discussion in arenas ranging from parliaments to coffeehouses. People who were completely indifferent to religion are now engaging in heated debates about its role in modern society -something unimaginable barely fifteen years ago. Much of this talk is informed by the media where religion stories are increasingly prominent. Not only has the presence of religion in the media quantitatively increased in the new millennium, but religion also seems to carry more weight as a news item -not least because of its frequent association with social problems. 3 In the 6 refute what has happened in Essex. 12 A problem also arises out of the term itself. The term "desecularization" and references to a "resurgence" of religion in the modern world imply that secularization has in fact happened and what we are witnessing now is a return of religion in public life. At the same time, however, many of those arguing for desecularization emphasize the fact that the world (with the possible exception of Western Europe) has never been secular. There is an obvious logical discrepancy here. Yet, as I will argue below, desecularization can be a useful term when used with reference to the visibility of religion in particular.
Although some commentators 13 continue to use "desecularization", its application has been limited owing to the problems described above. However, the concept of "deprivatization", 16 Herbert argues that "deprivatization is inappropriate in post-communist societies because communism suppressed and denied the legitimacy of any private sphere, seeking to remove all obstacles between the state and the individual." 17 As I will discuss below, Herbert's own term "republicization" is potentially a more useful concept in analyzing the public visibility of religion.
Finally, we have the now-ubiquitous "post-secularity". The current faddishness of the "postsecular" and "post-secularity" owes much to the weight that the name of Jürgen Habermas has given it. 18 Habermas was not the first to use the term, but it was his use of the "postsecular" that sparked the current flood of discussion. Although, in many cases it seems that there is very little actual discussion but rather an uncritical acceptance of post-secularity as an accurate description of the state of things in the world. There are critical assessments as well, 19 but equally many studies that treat post-secularity as an empirical premise, no matter how inconclusive the evidence. 20 In these treatments Habermas' originally normative use of the concept -that religious arguments have a right to be heard in the public sphere, even if the state should remain secular 21 -is changed into a description of historical change, or rather, historical stability. The "will to religion" -"the discursive construction of a normal in which we are all religious", as Lori Beaman beautifully puts it -is, it seems, strong among scholars of religion.
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The problem of making the conceptual leap from a normative statement to empirical premise is not the only problem with the uses of "post-secularity". What I would like to add, however, is that in light of what is said about the problems of postsecularity and the transition to a "new era" that it implies, desecularization does not seem such a bad concept after all. As discussed above, it makes little sense to say that the world that was never actually secular is now being desecularized. But "desecularization" can be useful when applied to the public visibility of religion, and used in a limited sense. the shift to market-led welfare provision "marked a conscious move towards provision of all sorts of services, not by government, but by voluntary sector agencies" (my emphasis).
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The argument that "welfare utopianism" killed public religion bestows too much power on the state and sidesteps crucial social changes to be the full story of the new visibility of religion. Can we really claim that the public attention paid to diversity and the potentially negative aspects of religion are residues of secularist thinking? The war on terror, for example, was not exactly initiated by hard-line secularists. Religious people seem to be as capable of differentiating between "good" and "bad'" religion as "illiberal secularists."
Associating neoliberalism with the new visibility of religion is correct, as I will argue below, but not in the sense of restoring some kind of market equilibrium in religion's public presence after a period of interfering government. The perception of religion as a social problem is as much an outcome of rapid global change as it is of secularist ideology, the neoliberal appropriation of religion as much an outcome of active policy as 'welfare utopianism' was.
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Religion as a Social Problem 38 Dinham and Jackson, "Religion, Welfare and Education," 276. 39 As an aside, despite disagreeing with the argument, I welcome the openly political position that Woodhead takes in her chapter. Sociology of religion -with the exception of feminist work -has traditionally shied away from openly political commitments, in my opinion to the detriment of the sub-discipline. However, even if I laud the commitment, I do not share the politics and find it difficult to avoid a comparison with famous leftwing historian Eric Hobsbawm's assessment of a 19 th century conservative: "The British jurist, A.V. Dicey (1835-1922) saw the steamroller of collectivism, which had been in motion since 1870, flattening the landscape of individual liberty into the centralized and levelling tyranny of school meals, health insurance and old age pensions." Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875 -1914 (London: Abacus, 1987 , 103.
The idea of the welfare state was, in principle, to combat the social problems endemic to rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, especially during post-war reconstruction. In practice the motivations for setting up public welfare have been contingent on various political and social factors, but combating social problems has always been the explicit core of welfare provision. In the European context, care of the poor and the sick was of course for a long time mainly the function of local parishes and certain religious orders. Later, organizations such as the Salvation Army and the worker priest movement were established on religious principles to combat social problems. It was only in the twentieth century that the state assumed many of the functions that religious communities had traditionally had. In that sense, the role of religion as a solution to social problems is well established.
During the latter half of the twentieth century -and certainly after 9/11 in the new millennium -religion was, however, increasingly perceived not only as a solution, but also a source of social problems. 40 Interreligious strife has, of course, existed as long as there have been competing communities of belief and practice (making some religions problematic in particular contexts), and secularist states -revolutionary France, USSR and China -have at times struck at "reactionary" religion (making all religions problematic in their national contexts). The political attention given to religion has, however, reached new heights in immigration discourse is secular and because "most Christians are not xenophobes". 46 Hence, the apparently increased "troublesomeness" of religion, fuelled by sensationalistic media visibility, is not a measure of increased religiosity.
Second, even if we cannot say much about the return of religion in terms of belief or practice, the construction of religion, particular religions, or religious practices as problematic gives us important clues about the struggles to define regional, national, local, and individual identity: "Every version of an 'other,' wherever found, is also the construction of a 'self'".
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Hence, for example, every European version of Islam, wherever found, is also a construction of Europe. 48 Defining social problems and their solutions then becomes a question of power:
who gets to define "bad" and "good" religion? This is an especially pertinent question in a time where religion is increasingly co-opted by governments for welfare and diversity management purposes.
Religion as Expedient
One aspect of the new visibility of religion which has mostly escaped the attention of for combating social problems". 49 "Religion as expedient" refers, then, to "policies and practices that acknowledge the potential of drawing on religious resources to solve problems". 50 In an age of "big society" and "rolling back" the state, "faith" has become a political resource: "'Faith' in policy parlance, becomes something which may (or may not) be useful and, moreover, 'usable' by the state and civil society". 51 In sparked a debate about the role of religion in the provision of welfare and social problems prevention (Farnsley, 2007; Davis, 2011 this chapter, the aspect that mediatization theory does capture and confirm is that increased visibility does not equal increased vitality or influence.
Conclusion: Religion as Problem, Religion as Utility
What to make of these theorizations of the new visibility of religion, then? On the one hand, and at the risk of repetition, it is clear that visibility, vitality and social influence are different things. The sometimes barely contained enthusiasm about the new visibility of religion has done a disservice to the analytical study of religion. The celebrationist account seems to be doomed to repeat the sins of the secularization thesis, which was, according to one famous opponent, "a taken-for-granted ideology rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions." 63 Yet, as argued above, visibility can have a potential impact on vitality and social influence, although not necessarily in ways imagined by religious communities themselves. Visibility informs the ways in which we talk about religion -not to mention that in many cases it is the reason why religion is back on the everyday, political and media agendas in the first place.
On the other hand, it is apparent that what counts in the public visibility of religion is practice, not belief. Beliefs are not very interesting per se (beyond the occasional tabloid story about the "weird" beliefs of new religious movements). The practices putatively arising from particular beliefs are. Public controversy about religion tends to be almost exclusively about things such as headscarves, opposition to teaching evolution in schools, and the putative religious motivations of violence. Heresy is not an argument against particular religions in contemporary Europe; immoral -however that is defined -or possibly illegal actions by religious individuals or groups is. Similarly, European states are, at least in principle, neutral regarding religious beliefs. Religion becomes interesting when it is seen to contribute positively (as in welfare provision) or negatively (as in "parallel societies," or violence) to the broader society.
Is God back, as Micklethwait and Wooldridge claim? The blunt answer is: no. To put it differently: Religion, not God, is back. There is an internal secularization of discourse, if you will, at work in the new visibility of religion. Religion, as any cultural phenomenon, is the object of different types of valorisations -ascriptions of value -and, despite all the talk about "faith," it is the social contribution of religions rather than faith that is being valorised.
In the case of welfare, for example, "religious groups are recognized for the instrumental role they play in delivery of services and cohesion. It is their public activity which is in focus, not the interior life of faith itself, nor the religious reasons or goals which motivate it." 64 This is the "secular return of religion": Religion is visible because it can be good or bad, but God has little to do with it.
